New York’s EPR bill could lock in corporate control of reuse—unless we fix it now

New York is considering a landmark packaging law. EPR — “extended producer responsibility” — is a policy that makes the companies selling packaged products pay for and manage the waste their packaging creates. That sounds like progress. But PRRIA (S1464/A1749), New York’s proposed EPR bill, would hand a decade of control to the very companies behind the packaging crisis, with weak public oversight and multiple escape hatches for chemical recycling and plastic-first compliance.

It also leaves out the simplest form of reuse: BYO, or “bring your own container” — the everyday practice of customers using their own cups, bags, or containers instead of disposables. If a reuse law can’t protect that, something is structurally wrong.

This page explains the 15 structural problems in PRRIA, what we’re proposing instead, and what you can do to push for real amendments before the bill locks in.

As published: Times Union (Dec. 12, 2025) | River Reporter (Nov. 18, 2025)

If New York wants packaging EPR that actually reduces waste, it cannot be governed by producers, audited through limited summaries, and insulated from local innovation by centralized funding control by PRO.

PRRIA needs structural amendments: a publicly governed implementing body; mandatory open data; bright-line bans on funding or counting chemical conversion and mass-balance accounting; and guaranteed support for real reuse, including BYO and community-led systems.

Table of Contents

Click any item below to jump to that section.

• The problems: 15 structural flaws in PRRIA
  1. Producer-controlled governance with no public-interest safeguards
  2. No explicit ban on funding chemical recycling/conversion as disposal
  3. Plastic can comply through recycling alone, and community reuse like BYO is left out
  4. Funding preemption centralizes power and can squeeze local reuse innovation
  5. No guaranteed public access to producer-level data
  6. PFAS is listed, but PFAS is not defined as a class
  7. DEC capture risk is not corrected, it is amplified
  8. Advisory council is non-binding and can be stacked
  9. Inspector General is not independent governance
  10. Fee-setting and “eco-modulation” are PRO-controlled and not transparently auditable
  11. Mass-balance accounting is not prohibited
  12. Rulemaking can re-open loopholes (SB 54 lesson)
  13. Delays and waivers weaken accountability
  14. Litigation exposure baked into the private-PRO model
  15. “Recycling” allows downcycling into dead-end products
      
• Solution and amendments (start here)
  • Our solution: Replace corporate control with public governance
  • Our proposed amendments (summary table & a link to full proposal)
• Call for action
• Our op-eds and recommended reading

Also, see Why Industry Opposes PRRIA—And Why That Doesn’t Make It a Good Bill.

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The problems: 15 structural flaws in PRRIA

1. Producer-controlled governance with no public-interest safeguards

TL;DR: The companies that caused the plastic crisis would run the system meant to fix it — with no public-interest governance required inside the PRO.

PRRIA creates a single statewide nonprofit “producer responsibility organization” (PRO) run by the companies that make and sell packaging – including the major brands and packaging manufacturers that profit from single-use plastics. These are the same corporate actors whose packaging has driven today’s plastic waste crisis. The bill requires them to join the PRO for ten years, and the PRO writes the plan, proposes the fees, and directs how the money is spent (Proposed ECL §§ 27-3401(15), 27-3403(1), 27-3405(1)).

The problem is structural: the bill does not require public-interest governance inside the PRO – no independent board requirements, no public-interest majority, and no clear safeguards to prevent industry from controlling the program’s priorities.

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2. No explicit ban on funding chemical recycling/conversion as disposal

TL;DR: Chemical recycling is called “disposal” in the bill, but nothing actually bars EPR money from paying for it.

So-called “chemical recycling” is the industry term for breaking plastic down with heat or chemicals (for example, pyrolysis, gasification, or solvolysis). These processes typically turn plastic into fuels, gases, or chemical feedstocks, and they are widely contested as a recycling solution.

PRRIA defines pyrolysis, gasification, solvolysis, and “chemical conversion” as disposal, not “recycling” (Proposed ECL § 27-3401(8), (24)). But it does not add a bright-line prohibition on using EPR funds to support chemical conversion as a disposal pathway.

In fact, PRRIA requires producer fees to cover “the cost of handling non-recyclable material types collected as part of a recycling operation” (Proposed ECL § 27-3414(4)(g)). Because the bill does not bar EPR-funded contracts with disposal facilities, this creates a structural route for chemical conversion to be financed as “handling” of non-recyclable residuals.

Without an explicit funding ban, a producer-run plan could use this “residual handling” obligation to justify contracts that send mixed or contaminated plastics to chemical conversion facilities, while still labeling it “disposal” on paper.

Definitions alone do not prevent chemical conversion buildout.

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3. Plastic can comply through recycling alone, and community reuse like BYO is left out

TL;DR: Plastic companies can hit their targets through recycling alone — real reuse, including BYO, is not required or even explicitly protected.

Plastic recycling has repeatedly failed to deliver on its promises (See Los Angeles Times, Greenpeace, Just Zero, Reuters), yet PRRIA allows plastic packaging companies to meet the bill’s plastic goals through recycling alone, even if reuse stays near zero. PRRIA also sets minimum reuse requirements for non-plastic packaging, but not for plastic packaging (proposed ECL § 27-3431(2)(b)).

In practice, this steers investment toward more plastic recycling volume instead of reuse systems that actually cut packaging at the source.

PRRIA also defines “reuse” and “reuse and refill systems” around packaging returned within a managed system (proposed ECL § 27-3401(26)-(28)). It does not mention or explicitly protect customer-provided containers, commonly known as “bring your own container” (BYO).

Combined, this structure creates a strong incentive for PRO-controlled funding to prioritize processing more plastic through recycling and proprietary reuse programs, while community reuse like BYO can be left unsupported.

Instead of doubling down on recycling-first compliance, PRRIA should be amended to require real reuse for plastics and to explicitly support community reuse, including customer-provided containers.

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4. Funding preemption centralizes power and can squeeze local reuse innovation

PRRIA preempts local jurisdiction over program costs and funding mechanisms. Even though it preserves local choice over what materials are included in local recycling collection, it centralizes the financial architecture that determines what gets built and supported statewide (Proposed ECL § 27-3439). That structure can further sideline community-led reuse systems like BYO that do not match the PRO’s preferred model.

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5. No guaranteed public access to producer-level data

Companies report data to the PRO and DEC, but the bill restricts disclosure of company-identified “proprietary” information and does not require publication of the underlying company-by-company dataset in usable form. Annual summaries are not the same as open data. (Proposed ECL §§ 27-3405(3), 27-3405(7), 27-3419(2).)

In a producer-run PRO model, producer-level reporting is not public accountability. DEC can review plans and summaries, but without mandatory open data and strong independent audit rules, DEC oversight becomes largely procedural – and the public cannot verify whether the system is honest.

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6. PFAS is listed, but PFAS is not defined as a class

PFAS are widely known as “forever chemicals” because many of them persist and accumulate. PFAS is not one chemical – it is a large family of thousands of related chemicals.

PRRIA restricts PFAS, but it does not define PFAS as a chemical class in the statute (Proposed ECL § 27-3425(1)(a)(iii)), which invites loopholes: manufacturers can swap one PFAS for another or argue that certain PFAS “don’t count.” Leaving the core definition to rulemaking is a structural mistake, because the fight shifts from “keep PFAS out” to “which PFAS are covered,” and industry will pressure the narrowest definition possible.

Without a clear class definition in statute, ‘PFAS-free’ can become a paperwork claim instead of a real chemical restriction.

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7. DEC capture risk is not corrected, it is amplified

PRRIA assumes DEC can supervise a producer-run system in the public interest. In New York, that is structurally risky. PRRIA does not create an independent public-interest oversight body with real authority to counterbalance industry influence. (Program oversight and plan approval are assigned to DEC: proposed ECL §§ 27-3401(17), 27-3403(3), 27-3409(2), 27-3409(4), 27-3411(1).)

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8. Advisory council is non-binding and can be stacked

The advisory council is housed within DEC and provides recommendations. It has no binding approval or veto power over plans, budgets, targets, or funding choices. Members may serve up to ten consecutive years, which can entrench influence and allows the council’s balance to be shaped by appointments rather than public-interest safeguards (See Proposed ECL §§ 27-3411(1), 27-3411(3)).

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9. Inspector General is not independent governance

PRRIA creates a recycling inspector general within DEC with investigative and enforcement functions. It does not give that office authority to redesign the program, set targets, rewrite PRO plans, or control funding priorities (Proposed ECL § 27-3433(1)-(2)). Inspector General is not a substitute for democratic governance of the system.

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10. Fee-setting and “eco-modulation” are PRO-controlled and not transparently auditable

PRRIA requires fees and allows “eco-modulation,” but it does not set a transparent methodology, benchmarks, or public disclosure rules for how fees are calculated, adjusted, or credited. The PRO designs the fee structure in its plan, and the public is not guaranteed visibility into the fee logic that will shape corporate behavior. A producer-run PRO can make “eco-modulation” performative or toothless. (See Proposed ECL §§ 27-3407(4)(h)(i)-(ii), 27-3413(5)).

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11. Mass-balance accounting is not prohibited

TL;DR: Companies can claim recycled-content credits through bookkeeping rather than proving recycled material is actually in their products.

PRRIA allows the PRO to adjust fees or grant credits based on a producer’s claimed percentage of post-consumer recycled content, and it requires that percentage to be “verified.” But the bill allows verification to be done by the PRO itself or by an “independent” third party approved to provide verification services (Proposed ECL § 27-3413(6)). The statute does not define a rigorous verification standard, does not require public disclosure of the underlying data, and does not prohibit mass-balance accounting.

Mass balance allows “recycled content” claims to be assigned through bookkeeping allocation across a mixed feedstock system, even when the specific package a customer buys cannot be physically traced to recycled material. Put simply: it can let companies claim the benefit of recycled inputs on paper without proving those recycled inputs are actually in the specific product being sold. This structure invites inflated claims and weak accountability — and Colorado has already fought this battle: the state agency rejected “free allocation” mass-balance accounting as inconsistent with state law, and the American Chemistry Council sued to overturn that limitation.

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12. Rulemaking can re-open loopholes (SB 54 lesson)

California’s SB 54 rulemaking shows how “definitions” can be undermined after passage. In draft regulations, certain non-mechanical technologies can be treated as “recycling” if they meet a technical standard, even when the statute aimed to keep conversion pathways out. New York should not rely on definitions alone. It needs explicit statutory bans on counting and funding chemical conversion pathways.
For PRRIA’s rulemaking authority, see Proposed ECL §§ 27-3437, 27-3431(3).

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13. Delays and waivers weaken accountability

PRRIA has multi-year lag built in (plan submission, approval, and program start timelines), and it provides multiple waiver and exception pathways. These tools allow repeated delay of the hard parts with limited public leverage once the system is underway. See Proposed ECL §§ 27-3407(1)-(3) for delays and built-in lags, and , 27-3427(5)-(6), 27-3431(4), 27-3415(5) for waivers and exceptions.

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14. Litigation exposure baked into the private-PRO model

TL;DR: Oregon’s packaging EPR is already in federal court — and Colorado is already showing similar legal strain around producer fees, appeals, and private-PRO power. New York is building the same legally vulnerable private-PRO architecture.

Oregon’s packaging EPR law is now in federal court, and on February 6, 2026, a judge issued a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement against NAW (The National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors) members while the case proceeds. The complaint includes claims that Oregon unlawfully delegated regulatory power to a private PRO (Circular Action Alliance), raising due process and dormant commerce clause issues.

Similar legal strain is already visible in Colorado. There, a fight has broken out over Section 18.2.7, a rule that gives producers a hearing path to challenge eco-modulated dues. Colorado’s Office of Legislative Legal Services recommended repeal, arguing the rule exceeds statutory authority and conflicts with the state Administrative Procedure Act, while advocates argue the hearings process is necessary because otherwise producers are forced into binding arbitration with limited appeal rights. Their talking points also state that CDPHE (Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment) received a lawsuit from ILMA (Independent Lubricant Manufacturers Association) on March 12, 2026, challenging the constitutionality of the program on due process and non-delegation grounds.

These disputes expose a basic flaw in private-PRO systems: private entities gain major control over fees and compliance while transparency, accountability, and review remain weak or contested. New York should not replicate that model. It should establish a Department of Public Resource Stewardship, a public agency with clear statutory authority, open procedures, and real accountability built in from the start. That structure is far better positioned to withstand the kinds of due process, non-delegation, and transparency attacks now hitting private-PRO EPR systems.

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15. “Recycling” allows downcycling into dead-end products

PRRIA’s definition of recycling is broad and does not require the resulting product to be recyclable again
(Proposed ECL § 27-3401(24)). That allows packaging plastics to be “recycled” into dead-end products (for example, composites and plastic lumber) that cannot be recycled and become future waste, often while shedding microplastics during use. It postpones disposal by turning packaging into long-lived trash.

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Our solution: Replace corporate control with public governance

The common thread through all 15 problems is who controls the system. PRRIA delegates authority to a producer-run PRO with weak oversight. We propose replacing that model entirely with a publicly governed agency—a Department of Public Resource Stewardship (DPRS)—insulated from corporate influence and accountable to the public.

This is not a minor amendment. It is a structural alternative:

Build publicly governed, fully funded zero-waste infrastructure that treats reuse as a public function, insulated from corporate influence.

The core principle: Reuse as a right, not a brand.

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Our proposed amendments

We have drafted 10 amendments that would transform PRRIA from a producer-run compliance system into a publicly governed zero-waste infrastructure.

Summary of amendments

Amendment	What it fixes
1. Replace PRO with Public Department (DPRS)	Industry control, litigation risk, capture
2. Advisory council with real balance	Industry stacking, powerless oversight
3. Chemical recycling prohibition + funding ban	ISO/ASTM backdoor, CalRecycle loophole
4. Mass balance prohibition / PCR traceability	Inflated recycled-content claims
5. Transparency and public data access	Hidden producer data, FOIL limits
6. Protect local reuse and BYO	Preemption, underfunded community systems
7. PFAS class definition	Chemical substitution
8. Timeline acceleration + waiver guardrails	Implementation delays
9. Shell company loophole fix	Evasion via subsidiaries
10. Revised recycling definition	Downcycling, synthetic turf, source separation

Click here to read our full proposed amendment texts.

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Our op-eds and recommended reading

▶️ The Packaging Reduction Act is Greenwashing. N.Y. Must Do Better. Times Union, December 12, 2025.

▶️ What’s with New York’s EPR bill? River Reporter, November 18, 2025.
The New York Packaging Reduction and Recycling Infrastructure Act (S1464/A1749 ), an extended producer responsibility (EPR) bill, is one of the most talked-about environmental bills in Albany this year. On paper, it aims to make corporations responsible for the packaging waste they create. In practice, it’s a fascinating contradiction.

▶️ Also see John Douglas Moore, Esq’s Legally Speaking: EPR is No Panacea for California’s Troubled CRV (California Redemption Value) System published in Northern California Recycling Association’s newsletter (January 2021).

Moore is NCRA’s legal counsel and a former board member. His critique is valuable because it comes from long experience inside the recycling sector and focuses on the same structural issue raised here: without strong public oversight and enforcement, EPR promises can collapse in practice.

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Have feedback or can you help improve the draft amendments? Contact us at info [at] zerowasteithaca [dot] org.

Created: March 15, 2026